On 25 February 2022, a top official in President Biden’s administration said US sanctions imposed on Russia following the invasion of Ukraine were also intended to hit Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua. That month marked the 60th anniversary of the US blockade of Cuba, introduced in February 1962 with President Kennedy’s Proclamation 3447, ‘Embargo on All Trade with Cuba’. The ‘embargo’ of Cuba constitutes the longest and most comprehensive set of sanctions in modern history. It is a key instrument in the US toolkit to pursue regime change on the island. It is an act of war, a violation of human rights, designed to obstruct Cuban development, to undermine its example as a revolutionary alternative, and to intentionally cause suffering among the Cuban people. HELEN YAFFE reports.
While the pretext for US actions against Cuba has changed over six decades, the objectives have not. The goals are made clear in an April 1960 memorandum by Lester D Mallory, US Assistant Secretary of State: ‘to weaken the economic life of Cuba… to bring about hunger, desperation and overthrow of government’. The CIA had already launched operations against Cuba’s revolutionary government in late 1959, orchestrating acts of terrorism and sabotage. The human rights of the Cuban population were clearly of no concern. Although the Agrarian Reform of May 1959 had confiscated unproductive plantations over 1,000 acres and expropriated 70,000 acres from US sugar companies in January 1960, Mallory did not frame the proposed policy as retaliation for nationalisation, or to pressure the Cuba government for compensation; a claim subsequently made to justify the US ‘embargo’ in international law. The concern expressed was ‘communist influence.’
On 16 April 1961, ‘communist influence’ was confirmed when, on the eve of the Bay of Pigs invasion, Fidel Castro announced: ‘they cannot forgive…that we have carried out a socialist revolution right under the nose of the United States!’ The early measures of the revolutionary state rapidly encroached on private interests, domestic and foreign, dismantling the economic and political institutions of the old Cuba, a US client state, and building new institutions, power structures and social relations, adopting a centrally planned socialist economy and setting up ‘organisations of the masses’. The adoption of socialism and the shift to trade with the USSR and the socialist bloc enabled Cuba to survive the potentially devastating impact of the US blockade.
Embargo or blockade?
An embargo is when one nation establishes a policy not to trade with another nation; it is the prerogative of any nation. A blockade is when a country uses military threat or force to close the borders of another entity to international commerce; it prevents normal commercial activity with third parties. A blockade is an act of war. The cumulative effect of US sanctions on Cuba is to impede the island’s commerce with other states, their citizens and companies. The United States imposes a blockade on Cuba.
A history of incremental sanctions
In July 1960, three months after Mallory’s memorandum, President Eisenhower cut sugar imports from Cuba in response to nationalisations of US sugar interests on the island. Cuba responded with further nationalisations of US businesses. The USSR stepped in to purchase the sugar dropped by the United States.
The US blockade has subsequently been enforced through six main statutes:
- 1917 Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA), section 5(b): Prohibits, limits or regulates trade and financial transactions, including those related to travel, transport or business, in times of war or when a national emergency has been declared.
- 1961 Foreign Assistance Act, section 620(a): Prohibits assistance to the Cuban government and countries assisting Cuba, thus already endowing US sanctions with an extraterritorial character. It authorised the President to establish a total embargo on Cuba, which Kennedy did on 3 February 1962.
- 1963 Cuban Assets Control Regulations, under section 5b of the TWEA: Cuban assets in the US were frozen, all financial and commercial transactions were prohibited unless approved by permit. Direct and indirect export of US products, services and technology to Cuba were prohibited, as were Cuban exports to the US, and transactions in US dollars in Cuba by citizens of any country. Penalties were imposed for violations by the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Asset Controls (OFAC).
By exploiting the island’s economic dependence on the US for trade, investment and loans, and its domination by sugar, those early sanctions might have brought the Cuban Revolution to its knees. The US dollar was established as the basis for international trade in 1944, giving the US huge power. The Soviet Union’s decision to assist the Cubans in 1960 threw them a lifeline and cushioned them from US sanctions for three decades.
That ended after the collapse of the USSR which generated a severe economic crisis as Cuba lost 87% of its trade and investment, and GDP nosedived by one-third in three years. The Cuban Revolution survived this ‘Special Period’ while preserving its socialist system.1 The Cuban economy was restructured for reintegration into a capitalist world market operating under neoliberalism and dominated by the US. The Cubans demonstrated remarkable resilience and creativity, as the US attempted to deliver a deathblow with new sanctions:
4. 1992 Cuban Democracy (Torricelli) Act: Prohibited foreign-based subsidiaries of US companies in third countries from trading with Cuba or Cuban nationals, banned foreign ships docking in Cuba from entering US ports for six months, barred travel to Cuba by US citizens, and limited family remittances to the island. Denied foreign assistance and debt relief to countries aiding Cuba, effectively confirming the status of sanctions as a blockade, not an embargo. Stipulated that medical goods can be exported to Cuba only with Presidential authorisation following ‘onsite inspections’ to verify the use and beneficiaries of the medical items. Added that ‘Food, medicine, and medical supplies for humanitarian purposes’ were only allowed when Cuba takes steps to introduce what the US President deems are free and fair elections for a new government.
5. 1996 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Helms-Burton) Act: Strengthened the extraterritorial impact of sanctions, threatening entities and individuals in third countries with legal action and denial of entry into the US for ‘trafficking’ in nationalised properties. It planned the transition government in a post-Castro era, with an explicitly capitalist economy, and ‘codified’ the blockade into law, removing the power of the US President to end it.
6. 2000 Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act: Authorised the sale of agricultural goods and medicines to Cuba for ‘humanitarian reasons’. However, it did not override the Torricelli Act stipulations about presidential authorisation and onsite verifications. 2005 regulations added that Cuba must pay for goods in full, in cash, before shipment. The Act also limited travel to Cuba by US citizens to 12 authorised categories requiring a licence.
Other regulations have been introduced over the years, creating a complex web of overlapping legislation that targets key economic and strategic areas of development in Cuba.
Republican? Democrat? Two sides of the same coin
The implementation of sanctions and OFAC fines continued post-2000. Analysis by Cuban scholars reveals that between 2001 and 2020, US sanctions legislation was applied 121 times against Cuba, largely used as a political tool to mobilise, reward or compensate key electoral sectors, particularly the Cuban exile community in the decisive electoral state of Florida.2 Sanctions have been accompanied by investments in sophisticated ‘regime change’ plans, from Clinton’s ‘People to People’ programmes, to Bush’s Plan for a Free Cuba and Obama’s ‘civil society engagement’. Since the late 2000s, a $20 million annual budget has been openly allocated for these so-called ‘democracy promotion’ programmes.
Trump tightens the US blockade
From 2017, President Trump’s administration ratcheted up hostility, culminating in 243 new actions, sanctions and coercive measures against Cuba, generating a new energy crisis and scarcity of basic goods (fuel, food and medicines) that replicates the severe economic crisis of the 1990s. The cost of finding unplanned, unbudgeted replacement sources puts terrible strain on the already weakened Cuban economy. The government uses its control over distribution to ration goods rather than leave it to survival of the fittest under the market mechanism. Rising at dawn to join queues has become part of the daily grind for Cubans.
Over 50 of the Trump measures were introduced during the pandemic, as Cuba struggled to import medical ventilators, PPE, syringes and oxygen tanks for its Covid-19 response. Shrinking resources were channelled into its public health mobilisation. To protect the population, Cuba closed its borders at the start of the pandemic, leading to a 70% fall in tourism and a huge loss in revenue. It ended 2020 with a 11% fall in GDP. Unlike most countries, Cuba has no lender of last resort and no emergency funding to help it through crises.
Trump returned Cuba to the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism just days before leaving office, immediately qualifying Cuba as ‘high risk’ for international banks and investors. Few international banks will now transact with Cuba for fear of OFAC fines. This hugely complicates normal commerce; even humanitarian donations are obstructed. Reneging on his campaign promise to reverse these measures, President Biden has added new sanctions targeting officials in the Cuban state and renewed the TWEA measures against Cuba.
Sanctions on Russia
Like the rest of the world, Cuba will be hit by rising global prices of oil and essential foodstuffs resulting from sanctions on Russia. It will also be impacted in specific ways: 1) Russian financial institutions that facilitate payments to Cuba, including by third countries, will be blocked. 2) Cuban and Venezuelan trade in oil and other services may be obstructed because in 2019 Venezuelan oil company PDVSA moved its administrative functions from Portugal to Russia to evade US sanctions. 3) Development plans agreed between Russia and Cuba may now be halted, including upgrades to Cuba’s railway system, a steel plant, oil production facilities, thermal power plants, and airline fleet. 4) As a direct result of sanctions, Russian airlines have stopped flying to Cuba and ticket sales have been suspended. In 2021, Russia became the principal source of tourism to Cuba and Russians were expected to make up 20% of all visitors in 2022. The tourism sector is vital for the island’s post-Covid recovery.
Sanctions as war
US sanctions programmes target over 20 countries. In 2019, 88% of international transactions involved US dollars, giving the US extraordinary power over global trade. By 2018, the National Association of Cuban Economists calculated the cost of the blockade to be $4.4 billion annually, equivalent to $12 million every day. This cost shot up over $9 billion in 2020, with a cumulative total of over $144 billion in six decades.
International bodies have documented the high cost in terms of human suffering, which, along with the exterritorial character, puts US sanctions on Cuba in violation of international treaties and conventions. US/British sanctions on Iraq killed half a million children in the 1990s, more than 150 a day. In 1997, the American Association for World Health concluded that in Cuba: ‘A humanitarian catastrophe has been averted only because the Cuban government has maintained a high level of budgetary support for a health care system designed to deliver primary and preventative health care to all of its citizens’. In other words, the socialist system has protected the Cuban people.
In June 2021 the UN General Assembly voted, for the 29th consecutive year, to end the US blockade of Cuba; 184 countries supported the Cuban motion with just the US and Israel opposed. Beyond this annual vote, Britain, the European Union, Canada, and other countries have ‘blocking’ legislation that protects their own entities and citizens from the US’ Cuba sanctions. However, they have failed to implement that legislation for fear of incurring the wrath of the US and OFAC fines. It is up to people in those countries to insist that they do. It is more urgent than ever to end the US blockade and finally give Cuban socialism the chance to prosper, and not just survive.
Fight Racism! Fight Imperialism! No 287, April/May 2022
- See Helen Yaffe, We Are Cuba! how a revolutionary people have survived in a post-Soviet world, Yale, 2020.
- Ernesto Domínguez López and Seida Barrera Rodríguez, ‘La Conformación de la política de Estados Unidos hacia Cuba’, http://www.revflacso.uh.cu/index.php/EDS/article/view/489/585, 2020.
