Cuba, Africa, and Apartheid’s End: Africa’s Children Return! by Isaac Saney, Lexington Books, 2023. £35
The book analyses the background, impact, and aftermath of Cuba’s key role in the protection of Angola, the liberation of Namibia, and the overthrow of apartheid rule in South Africa. The story revolves around the 1988 Battle of Cuito Cuanavale, where Angolan and Cuban forces, with the support of the USSR, managed to withstand the pressure of the South Africa Defence Force (SADF) and lay the groundwork for a future offensive to bring down the Pretoria regime. In his book, author Isaac Saney examines this contribution in its wider historical, political, and cultural context, drawing upon an extensive range of new evidence, including newspapers, interviews, memoirs and intelligence reports. Saney puts forward two main theses, both of which can be summarised through the words of Nelson Mandela, the historic leader of the African National Congress and the first black president of South Africa from 1994 to 1999. First, Mandela emphasised the significance of the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale, which not only shifted the tide of the war between Angola and South Africa, but also represented ‘a milestone in the history of the struggle for southern African liberation…a turning point in the struggle to free the continent and our country from the scourge of apartheid’ (p5). Secondly, Mandela acknowledged the fundamental role played by the Cubans in this pivotal moment of the southern African national liberation struggle, affirming that ‘The Cuban internationalists have made a contribution to African independence, freedom, and justice, unparalleled for its principled and selfless character’ (p2).
Cuba’s internationalism
The book begins by examining the context of national liberation during the early Cold War before the triumph of the Cuban revolution, when the political conversation was dominated by the Non-Aligned Movement. Promoting political independence from the US or USSR blocs, the movement quickly became paralysed by the divisions between advocates of liberal democracy and revolutionary socialism. A way out of this stalemate was offered by socialist Cuba, which in 1966 founded the Tricontinental Conference, an attempt to firmly place the struggle for the decolonisation and liberation of the countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America in the anti-imperialist and the socialist bloc. While the historical analysis of this period is very detailed, the political evaluation of the Tricontinental Conference presents some issues. For example, the definition of its ‘incomplete success’ in ‘changing the ruling class from foreign to local’ (p34) is somewhat ambiguous. Saney’s downplaying of the socialist character of Cuban internationalism in favour of more ethnic or historical reasons is also problematic. The reality is that Cuba’s firm support for a socialist solution to the national liberation struggle was most evident in Angola, where Cuba, along with the USSR, provided diplomatic assistance and military training to the socialist People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) as early as 1965 – a decade before hostilities with South Africa and more than 20 years before the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale.
South Africa’s total strategy
The political situation in southern Africa became increasingly charged after the overthrow of Portuguese fascist rule in April 1974, which subsequently led to Angolan independence in January 1975. South Africa perceived the Angolan national liberation movement as a direct threat to its power, since the example set by the Angolans could inspire further emancipation struggles both within its colonial possession of Namibia and domestically, where apartheid institutionalised a strict system of racial segregation between the white and black populations. This is exactly what happened in South Africa between 1974 and 1976, a pivotal moment of the anti-apartheid struggle, when black youth began organising around the Black Consciousness Movement and black workers’ strikes increased by 900%. In response, the SADF invaded Angola in October 1975, but was successfully repelled by the MPLA with crucial support from Cuban forces and Soviet weapons. This first military failure spurred South African reactionary forces to develop a comprehensive plan known as the ‘total strategy’, which involved increased repression of black people and progressive forces within South Africa, as well as interventions, destabilisation, and intimidation in Angola. The two sides found themselves deadlocked until the summer of 1987 when both attempted to gain an advantage. The Angolan and Cuban forces struck first, achieving a significant victory that was however swiftly overturned during the South African counter-offensive, resulting in the relinquishing of all previously conquered territory and heavy losses for the Angolans and Cubans. This phase of the conflict was also marked by tactical disagreements between the Soviet and Cuban military leadership. The USSR advocated in fact for an escalation of the conflict through the deployment of additional military weaponry, while the Cubans adopted a more cautious approach, avoiding actions that could provoke South African counterattacks and focusing instead on fortifying their positions and implementing military techniques more suitable to the African context.
The Battle for Cuito Cuanavale
Under mounting pressure from the SADF, the Angolan MPLA leadership requested further Cuban assistance in November 1987. This led to Operation Manoeuvre 31, which increased the total number of Cuban armed forces in Angola to 55,000. The operation, decided without consulting the Soviets, led the Cubans to later take command of all Angolan troops, used to bolster the defence of Cuito Cuanavale. This was a strategically significant town that was small in size but possessed favourable geographical features for defending the southwestern region of the country as well as the road to Angola’s capital, Luanda. In a series of bloody clashes between February and March 1988, the Cubans and Angolans repelled three massive SADF offensives, largely thanks to a robust defence system consisting of minefields, artillery, and air power. As Castro sarcastically remarked, in Cuito Cuanavale ‘The South African planes were on the ground, and the South African tanks were flying’ (p137). However, the Cuban strategy was not limited to defence alone. While they successfully drew in and contained the SADF in southwest Angola, they also planned a counterattack on the poorly defended Namibian border. Yet the Cubans exercised caution as their aim was to exert enough political pressure to create space for negotiations. Despite being in an advantageous position, they opted not to invade Namibia to minimise casualties, prevent US involvement in the conflict, and avoid the potential use of nuclear weapons by South Africa. However, when the SADF struck first in June 1988, Cuban airstrikes targeted the Calueque Dam, which not only damaged a vital water infrastructure for Namibia’s economy but also demonstrated the Cuban military’s undisputed dominance over the South African air forces.
The end of apartheid
While as early as 1978 the United Nations had passed a resolution condemning South Africa’s occupation of Namibia, little changed until June 1988, largely due to the support of the United States, which voted in favour of the resolution but opposed any sanctions against the apartheid regime. According to the author, the military setbacks were the main but not the only factor that compelled South Africa to accept Namibian independence. Above all, the increasingly negative economic outcomes, exacerbated by bloated military expenditures reaching 14% of the annual budget, forced the government to focus on domestic affairs, prioritising the enormous resources required to maintain a repressive police force and sustain apartheid rule. In the second half of the 1980s, in response to mounting opposition to the war and to the economic downturn, the South African government declared a series of states of emergency, further curtailing the constitutional rights of black working-class people and effectively suppressing the impact of the anti-apartheid struggle. However, the deteriorating economic, political, and military situation led the ruling classes of South Africa to gradually abandon the government and support the reform of the apartheid regime, a reform which was successfully achieved by the more moderate faction within the same apartheid government. In a swift turn of events, only one year after the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale, South Africa legalised previously banned left-wing parties and promised to end apartheid, which eventually occurred through a referendum in 1992. The sacrifices of the 330,000 Cuban troops who served in Angola, and the 2,000 who lost their lives in this endeavor, contributed to the emergence of two independent countries, Angola and Namibia, and to South Africa’s liberation from the apartheid.
A story of proletarian internationalism
Saney’s account pays tribute to a key chapter of Cuban history, which today continues to exercise the duty of international solidarity by sending medical brigades and medicines to the oppressed people of the world. However, while the book is well-researched and well-written, a different editorial and political approach could have improved its readability. The abundance of detailed information limits the book to a primarily academic readership, and the focus on cultural, political, and military aspects leaves little room for a Marxist and historical materialist understanding of the socio-economic factors behind the end of apartheid. Despite Moscow’s increasingly revisionist attitude in the 1980s, the author also tends to portray the USSR in a quite negative light, giving considerable attention to tactical disagreements with the Cubans while downplaying the political, diplomatic, and military contributions of the Soviets. Conversely, the book credits China with a supposedly more radical approach but fails to mention its shameful and opportunist support, along with the US, for the counterrevolutionary Angolan forces of UNITA and FNLA against the MPLA. However, the most significant limitation of the book is its inclination to downplay the socialist foundation of Cuba’s exceptional example of internationalism in Angola, reducing it to an act of solidarity between the Cuban and the African people. African oppression and rebellion played a crucial role in the Cuban history, and this foundation was never forgotten in Cuba since 1959, helping the Revolution to continuously fight for improving social justice and racial equality. But more than the solidarity between two peoples, what has brought and continues to bring Cuban internationalists to Africa, as well as to all corners of the world is their Marxist-Leninist awareness that racism and imperialism can only be defeated by class struggle and socialist revolution. Only socialism is the mode of production which liberates those material and social forces leading to the defeat of racism and imperialism and achieving real emancipation of exploited and oppressed people. The Cubans, who fought and won their Revolution, are fully conscious of this duty, which they steadfastly uphold even in the face of increasingly stifling economic limitations imposed by US imperialism. That is why their unwavering commitment to internationalism, both during the Cold War era and today, serves as an exemplary model for socialists worldwide.
Alexander Trome
FIGHT RACISM! FIGHT IMPERIALISM! 295 August/September 2023
